U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

One of the most significant decisions involving RV parking took place in Euclid, Ohio, in 1977. This was a major victory for RV owners for two reasons: the focus of the case was on aesthetic values, and the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.

Following is a synopsis of the events that led to this landmark decision; the text was prepared by Corinne Shulman, a California attorney. The case is known as City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, et al., 48 Ohio App. 2d 297,357 N.E. 2d 402 (1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1094, 51 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1977).

Some years ago, Euclid, Ohio, adopted an ordinance that prohibited the parking of "any type of truck, trailer, auto trailer or trailer coach" in residential areas, on either public or private property, unless such unit was "parked or stored in a completely closed structure."

In 1974, nine RV owners were cited for parking their RVs on their property, and they and others banded together in a determined effort to fight the ordinance. The matter was tried at the municipal court level as a criminal offense and the owners were found guilty and fined, the trial court finding the ordinance constitutional.

The RV owners appealed and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed their convictions, finding the ordinance unconstitutional. It is that decision, made in February 1976, to which we've referred you, for subsequent petitions by the City of Euclid, first to the Ohio Supreme Court and then to the U.S. Supreme Court, were both denied and the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals is now final. The state appellate court said that in Ohio, zoning restrictions for purely aesthetic reasons are unconstitutional, and that the ordinance, to be constitutional, must be a valid exercise of police power, the power to regulate for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. The court then stated that:

The vice of the present ordinance is that the record will support neither an application of the ordinance which bears a substantial, and therefore reasonable, relationship to public health, safety, morals or welfare nor the imposition of a taxonomic scheme based on any state of facts that may reasonably justify it. Part of the lack of reasonableness is exposed by evidence of an uneven regulatory application.

Reviewing the facts illustrated the "constitutional inadequacies of the ordinance." The city had produced testimony to show that a trailer parked in a driveway would interfere with access for fire-fighting equipment, would serve as a conduit for fire, was more difficult to move than a car, lowered property values, and under certain circumstances, could create a safety hazard by obstructing the view of street traffic.

The RV owners had produced evidence to show that automobiles (which were not prohibited from driveway or street parking) could be conduits for fire and/or cause fire hazards and may be unsightly when stored outside. But the state appellate court properly disregarded this evidence, following a generally recognized rule of law that it is for the trier of the fact (here the trial court) to resolve conflicts in evidence. The court then posed and answered the constitutional question:

Where, then, are the Due Process and Equal Protection vices of the ordinance? They lie in the indisputable fact that enclosing vehicles classified as trailers does not change the fire hazard propensities and it does not enlarge health safeguards. Indeed it is clear beyond peradventure that enclosure may diminish health and safety factors by trapping sewage spillage from portable sanitary facilities and collecting highly flammable escaping propane gas which would otherwise be dissipated in the air. These are factors too obvious to be resolved on mere credibility determinations. They point up the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the attempt to regulate. Uncontrovertable evidence also supports the Equal Protection violation in requiring vehicles in the trailer classification to be enclosed.